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Abstract
Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels  theory of mind, it is 
argued that metacognition need not involve metarepresentation, nor semantic forms of 
reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a  task-specific system monitors 
its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, 
may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with 
a theory of mind.
An important conceptual issue raised by the target article consists in the sense of « self-
knowledge » engaged in confidence judgments that monkeys and dolphins seem to be 
able to form, in contrast with other species such as rats and pigeons. The authors tend 
to consider that the same notion of « self-reflexivity » applies in the realms of higher 
mental-states attribution and of metacognitive monitoring of the system’s epistemic 
states. While they accept the view that cognitive self-awareness may be different from 
self-recognition, they suggest that metacognition is a capacity that parallels  theory of 
mind : the latter asks « whether animals know and monitor the other’s mental states 
and states of knowing », the former  « whether animals know and monitor their own 
mental states and states of knowing » ( Section 3). This parallel may be misleading, 
however, in important ways. Given monkeys’ lack of theory of mind and absence of 
self-recognition (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, Anderson & Gallup, 1997), it is highly 
implausible that they have any mentalistic understanding of their ability to evaluate 
their own epistemic dispositions. But maybe Smith et al. rather suggest that 
metacognitive abilities constitute a precursor for the mentalistic abilities as found in 
humans. In this case, however, a clear distinction between mentalizing and 
metacognitive capacities is still needed. 
Whereas by definition an animal endowed with a « theory of mind » capacity is able to 
monitor and predict the behavior of others in a mentalistic way, that is, by attributing 
mental states to others, rather than on the basis of behavioral cues, metacognition does 
not seem to require any mentalistic attribution, still less so « to oneself ». Such a 
capacity presupposes that a control system i) has access to information concerning its 
present epistemic states (information that « self-monitoring » provides),  and ii)  uses 
it to select and complete a particular course of action. As the authors convincingly show 
in the specific case of SDT ideal strategies, such a hierarchical organization optimizes 
the benefit/cost ratio by applying hard-wired heuristics to the endogeneous feedback. It 
clearly is a procedural form of metacognition, a « know-how to decide » , that is not 
based on mental concepts and does not need  to be made explicit (even if one grants 
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977, that consciousness may be favorable to control, the proof 
of its being necessary is not made yet : see Reder & Schunn, 1996, Bargh, 1997, Spehn 
and Reder, 2000). 
 
On the background of the uncontroversial  control/monitoring  model, two claims made 
by Smith et al. deserve discussion: that metacognition is metarepresentational, and 
that it is « about the self ». 
A) Any control system involves a form of reflexivity at the task-level : there must be, 
as the authors write, a connection between the judgment of certainty and « the primary 
discriminatory process » in which it originates. (14.4). But they add the following 
comment on the relation between the two « .. The uncertain response (..)  is about the 
status of the primary discriminatory process and about its probable failure. It stands 
structurally outside  the primary discrimination and intrinsically meta-  to it. » (14.4). 
This observation, however, conflates « being about » and « being meta » : « being 
about » involves mental reference to an object, an event, or a property. « Being meta » 
just involves  hierarchical control between processes. The latter could qualify as 
metarepresentational, if control processes modelled not only the current epistemic 
states of the system, but also the attitudinal contents of the latter. But why should the 
control system need do this ? It is much more economical to have a mechanism that 
simply correlates the feasibility (probable success) of a task with preselected types of 
cues (like the quantity or intensity of the feedback), rather than one relying on the 
semantic processing of the first-order content of its epistemic states. Evidence of 
fractionation of the control system in task-specific frontal lobe modules (Shallice and 
Burgess, 1991) is compatible with the view that  no metarepresentation is taking place. 
The various primary processes present invariant properties that are predicting reliably 
success or failure in performing the corresponding task. This correlation becomes 
exploited when the corresponding mechanism is established by evolutionary selection 
and fine-tuned by learning.  
B) The notion of reflexivity at work is thus not necessarily intentional (i.e. 
representational) or referential ;  it may more plausibly be considered executive, 
architecture-bound or structural : the output of the control process depends in major 
part on the feedback it receives from the courses of action in their first-order 
« simulated » or « attempted » runs. But this dependence does not need to be 
semantic. An interesting « accessibility model » of how the search process is reflexively 
used in control is offered in Koriat, (1993). Here too, accessibility heuristics does not 
rely on content, but on properties of the content vehicles – for example, trace strength. 
Thus metacognition necessarily involves neither self-reflexivity, (in the sense of using 
an integrated representation of one’s own mental, social and physical dispositions), nor 
even mental-state reflexivity, but process-reflexivity.  
This leaves us with the question of how such an epistemically implicit control system 
can be a step towards theory of mind (and to consciousness). Having a procedural form 
of metacognition puts an organism in a position to gain the corresponding form of 
declarative knowledge if the conditions for de-modularization are met. Karmiloff-Smith, 
(1992) hypothesizes a mechanism of « representational redescription » making 
knowledge contained in  the mind accessible to  the mind. Such ideas have since then 
been explored in the evolutionary history of theory of mind (Povinelli, 2000). In this 
perspective, a metacognitive control system is a phylogenetic precursor for mentalizing 
ability not only because it offers procedural knowledge to a potential redescription 
mechanism, but  also because the resulting enhancement of executive capacities offers 
the control structure that decoupling requires. Inhibiting one’s own view of how things 
look in appreciating another person’s perspective, depends on adequate mental control 
(Perner, 1998). The difference between an implicit, non-mentalistic form of 
metacognition and its « redescribed » or explicit form, is that reflexivity occurs not only 
at the process level, but also at the semantic-intentional level (Proust, 2002). 
Metacognition now can be accessed by metarepresentations, and through language 
becomes available to self- and other-report,   to training, and, here we are, to 
theorizing. 
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